![]() The thesis begins with looking firstly at the values that human beings appear to hold in the world community. This work represents an attempt to see what measure of agreement exists on human values in the face of the radical disagreement in moral philosophy on fundamental human values, and a further attempt to see what would be the implications of these findings for bioethics. We are particularly focusing on learning difficulties as an illustration of the argument. One major question which then emerges is whether it is possible to have this framework and yet retain commitment to equal valuation of different human lives. We show how practitioners in the field are badly in need of a theoretical framework. We are interested in how measuring quality of life stems from and leads to a differential valuing of human lives in the work of many philosophers, and how, in stark contrast, measuring quality of life is a pragmatic concern for psychologists and other social scientists which stems from an equal valuation of different human lives. Thus, this is the question on which we primarily focus, rather than giving a detailed analysis of how quality of life might be measured. The most fruitful way of looking at these differences between the two disciplines and perhaps the most fruitful way of beginning a dialogue between them is in examining the issue of why quality of life is being measured. ![]() In this paper we aim to construct the beginnings of a dialogue between the two disciplines which will show how they could serve each other and yet also show how, from the dialogue, difficult and previously unconsidered issues emerge for both sides. Opening paragraphs: Measuring quality of life is of concern to both philosophers and psychologists, yet the two disciplines typically approach the question in very different ways, ways so diverse that it may look, as if they are engaged in such disparate activities that no dialogue between them is possible. Since within philosophy, these normative issues are often discussed in terms of personhood, this category is also critically examined and the conclusion is reached that it too has normative and social components which can lead to ethically dubious judgements being made about ‘the mentally handicapped’. To ignore this and attempt to make normative judgements on the basis of class membership is thus highly problematic. Our main intention is to explore the different ways in which mental handicap is defined and seen as a class.We conclude that class definition embodies a significant normative component and a large element of social construction. Careful comparison between the disciplines reveals major differences and indicates that much further work is needed which would be fruitful for both sides.The two disciplines concentrate on different questions: philosophy tends to look chiefly at mental handicap in relation to issues of personhood and is not very clear about what mental handicap is psychology on the other hand is much more specific about mental handicap, but shows little concern with critically examining value issues. ABSTRACT In this paper we compare philosophical and contemporary psychological approaches to mental handicap. ![]() A NOTE ON THE LANGUAGE: This paper uses the term 'mental handicap' which was the common term at time of publication to refer to intellectual disability.
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